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Financing Cr-ISIS: The Efficacy of
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties
in the Context of Money
Laundering and Terror Finance
ABSTRACT

Technological development throughout the past fifty years
has created a world in which information can be communicated
across the globe in no time at all. Internationallaw enforcement
tools like mutual legal assistance (MLA), on the other hand,
have not changed with nearly the same pace. Unfortunately,
criminal activity rarely stops at international borders,
necessitating internationalcooperation for any sort of effective
enforcement. As this Note will discuss, the problems attendant
in the current mutual legal assistancescheme, such as extensive
delay and incompatibility with electronic data, have led to
global tension over extraterritorialaction and conflict between
regulatory bodies. These developments are most stark in the
context of internationalfinancial crime, particularlythat which
is used to finance terroristorganizations. In order to keep pace
with these organizations, the process needs to be streamlined
and adjusted to handle large amounts of personal and financial
data. Such reform to the mutual legal assistance system is an
essential component of combatting money laundering and
disruptingglobal terroristnetworks.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In December 2016, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a
complaint seeking the forfeiture of assets linked to the Islamic State
(ISIS).1 Unlike a traditional criminal prosecution, however, the four
defendants in this complaint are property, rather than people. 2 This
civil forfeiture action seeks to circumvent the traditional criminal
justice system in an effort to disrupt terrorist funding networks
without pursuing criminal charges against any specific individual,
but instead seeking to seize assets which have themselves been
linked to criminal activity.3 The assets, a group of Roman antiquities
dating back to as early as 330 BC, were allegedly trafficked by ISIS in
an effort to finance its regime through a series of taxes. 4 One year
after the initial complaint was filed, the DOJ filed an amended
complaint, adding additional antiquities and, more notably, sought an
arrest warrant in rem for the very first named property-a gold ring
with a dark green gemstone, carved with a depiction of the Roman
goddess, Tyche. 5
However, this case is not as simple as other civil forfeiture
actions-none of the items sought are known to be located within the

1.
United States' Verified Complaint for Forfeiture in Rem at 2, United States
v. One Gold Ring with Carved Gemstone, an Asset of ISIL, Discovered on Electronic
Media of Abu Sayyaf, President of ISIL Antiquities Department [hereinafter One Gold
Ring], No. 1:16-CV-02442 (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 2016) [hereinafter 2016 ISIS Complaint].
2.
Id.
3.
Aruna Viswanatha & Georgi Kantchev, U.S. Files Suit to Seize Antiquities
Looted by Islamic State Militants, WALL ST. J., (Dec. 6, 2017, 1:14 PM),
https://www.wsj.comlarticles/u-s-tries-to-seize-antiquities-looted-by-islamic-state-andused-to-fund-terrorism-1512584097#comments sector [https://perma.cc/RAU6-HNQF]
(archived Nov. 4, 2018). This avenue is particularly useful in this instance because the
ISIS leader to whom the items were initially linked was killed in a raid in Syria in
2015, during which US law enforcement discovered the information relied upon by the
complaint. Id.
4.
See 2016 ISIS Complaint, supra note 1, at 3-4, 9.
5.
United States' Amended Verified Complaint for Forfeiture in Rem at 10,
One Gold Ring, No. 1:16-CV-02442 (D.D.C. Dec. 6, 2017) [hereinafter 2017 ISIS
Amended Complaint]; see also 2016 ISIS Complaint, supra note 1, at 8-9.
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territorial bounds of the United States. 6 Therefore, in order to
retrieve the antiquities and achieve the objective of disrupting one of
ISIS's sources of funding, the DOJ is left to rely on international
frameworks for cooperation between law enforcement entities. In this
case, the DOJ aims to send the arrest warrant in rem as part of a
mutual legal assistance (MLA) request to Turkey-the ring's last
known location. 7 Unfortunately, as this Note will discuss, the MLA
process is fraught with inefficiencies, particularly in the context of
counterterrorism and international financial crime.
An inevitable result of the increase in globalization and the
simplicity of transmitting money and data across hemispheres in
seconds has been a corresponding increase in international crime.
This type of crime is particularly pervasive in the financial sector and
opens up avenues through which to establish funding networks for
terrorist and criminal organizations. Unfortunately, because of the
transient nature of the evidence of this sort of criminal activity,
successful investigation and prosecution of this conduct by domestic
law enforcement is incredibly difficult. Domestic law enforcement
entities are increasingly reliant on MIA mechanisms to glean
information from their foreign counterparts necessary to develop
8
their investigations, particularly those involving international crime.
These legal mechanisms on which the United States and much of the
rest of the world rely are well intended but are unequipped to deal
with the mass amounts of data incident to these types of global
investigations.
In order to effectively combat transnational crime, the
international community must devise a cohesive, uniform vehicle
through which law enforcement bodies across the globe can exchange
information with one another and build investigations that cross
borders rather than cease at them. It also necessitates increased
utilization and cooperation with international law enforcement and
financial regulatory bodies; these bodies may operate both as central
information hubs and as potential mediators of international disputes
over data sharing and extraterritorial action. The current
mechanisms through which law enforcement agencies communicate
with their foreign counterparts are outlined, for the most part, in
bilateral or multilateral "mutual legal assistance treaties" (MIATs).9

Viswanatha & Kantchev, supra note 3.
6.
Government's Motion for Issuance of Warrant of Arrest in Rem, One Gold
7.
Ring, No. 1:16-CV-02442 (D.D.C. Dec. 6, 2017) [hereinafter 2017 ISIS Arrest Warrant].
Kimberly Prost, The Need for a Multilateral Cooperative Framework for
8.
Mutual Legal Assistance, in COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGIES IN A FRAGMENTED
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 93, 98 (Larissa Van Den Herik & Nico Schrijver eds.,
2013).
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE: CRIMINAL Div., PERFORMANCE BUDGET: FY 2017
9.
PRESIDENT'S BUDGET 25 (2016) [hereinafter DOJ BUDGET]; see DAVID MCCLEAN,
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The United States maintains these agreements with more than sixty
countries, while the United Kingdom (UK) has signed fewer than
twenty in addition to a broad agreement among the nations of the
European Union (EU). 1 0 Additionally, many areas of the world have
developed regional schemes for mutual assistance based on
geographic and cultural proximity.1 1 However, as this Note will
discuss, the current mutual legal assistance regime on the whole is
not without its problems.
Part II of this Note begins with a discussion of the background of
MLA,1 2 and of the general global trend toward international
cooperation and away from national isolationism. 1 3 While many
countries do buy into the current MLA system, some nations and
regions still steadfastly refuse to share information between law
enforcement agencies, or are party to MLA agreements but fail to
make use of them. 14 This hesitance may be due to political or
geographical isolation, or concerns about implicating a nation's own
citizens in international criminal investigations. 15 This Part also
discusses the historical use of the MILA regime specifically in the
context of investigating transnational crime and organizations that
finance terrorism. Finally, it lays out the most common problems that
come hand in hand with the system as it currently exists, such as

INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL MATTERS 185 (3d ed. 2012)

(discussing the MLAT scheme in place under the UN Model Treaty).
10.
Country Profile: United Kingdom, MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATIES,
https://mlat.info/country-profile/united-kingdom
(last visited
Nov.
4,
2018)
[https://perma.cc8ZT7-CQ5T] (archived Nov. 4, 2018); Country Profile: United States,
MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATIES, https://www.mlat.info/country-profile/unitedstates (last visited Nov. 4, 2018) [https://perma.cc/3SS7-9CUZ] (archived Nov. 4, 2018).
11.
Prost, supra note 8, at 98.
This Note uses the term "mutual legal assistance" as a general reference to
12.
the overarching framework created by bilateral and multilateral agreements between
nations, given that this framework is the most commonly used method by which law
enforcement agencies exchange information. Additionally, it tends to be used this way
in textual references given that the agreements are called "mutual legal assistance
treaties."
13.
See Alan Ellis & Robert L. Pisani, The United States Treaties on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters: A Comparative Analysis, 19 INT'L L. 189, 189 (1985)
(discussing increased concerns about transnational crime given the "shrinking of
international borders that has occurred since the end of [World War II]").
14.
See Prost, supra note 8, at 112 (noting "[t]here is little evidence of any use
being made of the Caribbean and SADC agreements," and the ECOWAS Treaty and
ASEAN and SAARC Conventions either lack practical necessity or are too new to
evaluate).
15.
See, e.g., Int'l Ctr. for Transitional Justice, Regional Judicial Cooperationin
the Fight Against Impunity for International Crimes: Analysis of National Regulatory
Systems and Internal Proceduresin View of the Protocol on Judicial Cooperationof the
ICGLR, 4-5 (March 15-16, 2016), https://ungreatlakes.unmissions.org/sites/default/
files/judicialcooperation-greatlakesconfreport eng-ictj.pdf
[https://perma.cc/44M7KEVK] (archived Nov. 4, 2018) (listing challenges to regional mutual legal assistance
agreements in the Great Lakes Region including lack of political willingness, human
rights challenges, and policies of exclusion).

2019]

FINANCING CR-ISIS

233

lack of efficiency, uniformity, and resources with which to fulfill
requests.
In Part III, the Note delves into potential avenues for
investigative action and data acquisition outside the MLA process.
Many of these avenues have historically been used by law
enforcement agencies and pose their own unique set of enforcement
and political difficulties. The United States has also developed
investigative and enforcement tools which give it greater latitude in
effecting domestic judgments against foreign actors, which have
impacted and incensed both the international law enforcement
community and the global financial community. These tools include
the use of domestic laws, like the Stored Communications Act (SCA)
and asset forfeiture, in addition to international financial regulations.
Part III also discusses conflict among and within enforcement bodies
engaged in the MLA system and the public and private implications
of the current system, particularly when it comes to the variation in
international data privacy protections.
Finally, Part IV begins by detailing the impracticability of
solutions that propose to eliminate the current MLA regime, and the
reasons to favor reform as an alternative. The Note specifies the
potential elements of reform necessary to combat the problems
currently faced by law enforcement and international governments.
Finally, Part IV concludes with an explanation of the problems
inherent in the system that are unable to be solved by reform, and
the potential implications of reform for those issues.

II. BACKGROUND
In order to understand the current mutual legal assistance
system that governs communication and assistance between national
law enforcement bodies, this Note will first lay out a brief background
on how the system came to exist. MLA as a general concept developed
concurrently with shifting notions toward the acceptability and utility
of bodies of international law and international cooperation. As
throughout the
development
and technological
globalization
twentieth century necessitated more sophisticated channels of
communication between foreign governments, international bodies
began testing out different methods of implementation of MLA that
were consistent with both domestic laws and the overall goals of the
program.16

See McCLEAN, supra note 9, at 151 (discussing role of technological
16.
development in obtaining and using evidence located abroad in criminal proceedings);
U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, MANUAL ON MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE AND
EXTRADITION 21 (2012), http://www.unode.org/documents/organized-crime/Publications/
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A. HistoricalDevelopment of MLA Mechanisms
At the time of the nation's inception, American institutions flatly
refused to provide assistance to foreign jurisdictions in criminal cases
and investigations.1 7 This refusal was based on the grounds that
providing such assistance would create a conflict of laws.1 8
Specifically, the United States did not believe in giving domestic
effect to foreign criminal prohibitions, particularly when the conduct
being investigated by the foreign entity would not result in criminal
liability in the United States.1 9 Additionally, the common law
tradition in the United States and the UK was seen as incompatible
with taking evidence abroad, given the potential conflict with the
Confrontation Clause and the inability to adequately assess the
reliability of the evidence at trial. 2 0 Subsequent legislation in the
United States in the mid-1800s regarding judicial assistance to
foreign nations held fast to this justification while still managing to
increase flexibility, choosing to restrict assistance to certain types of
testimony and certain civil suits. 2 1
Since the end of World War II, increased globalization has forced
foreign and domestic judicial bodies to develop new methods through
which to seek and receive assistance from other jurisdictions in
gathering evidence and building cases on criminal matters. 2 2 This
concept is generally referred to as mutual legal assistance. 2 3 During
this time period, restrictions on the provision of assistance to foreign
courts were loosened, and governments generally began to be more
amenable to providing international legal assistance in both civil and
MutualLegal Assistance-Ebook-E.pdf [https://perma.cc/CL3K-5FNR] (archived Nov.
6, 2018) [hereinafter UNODC Manual] ("Realistically, it is not possible to have a
bilateral treaty with every country in the world, but the increasing globalization of
crime requires States to have some means of international cooperation with all parts of
the globe.").
17.
Ellis & Pisani, supra note 13, at 191.
18.
Id.
Id. at 191. This notion is particularly interesting given the current US
19.
reliance on asset seizure/forfeiture laws to effectively require foreign jurisdictions to
give effect to US criminal laws.
See MCCLEAN, supra note 9, at 151 (discussing a defendant's right "to be
20.
confronted with the witnesses against him" found in both the Sixth Amendment and
traditional English practice).
21.
See Ellis & Pisani, supra note 13, at 191-92 (discussing the Act of March 2,
1855 limiting assistance to witness testimony where letters rogatory have been
submitted, and the Act of March 3, 1963 limiting judicial assistance to suits for the
"recovery of money or property" where the government is a party or has an interest).
22.
See Prost, supra note 8, at 115 (in a discussion of mutual legal assistance,
citing extradition as an example of an area of law in which globalization has
necessitated development in the international cooperation framework).
23.
Anton Du Plessis, A Snapshot of InternationalCriminal Justice Cooperation
Against Terrorism Since 9/11, in COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGIES IN A FRAGMENTED
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, supra note 8, at 29, 37 (referring to the framework for
formal assistance as "mutual legal assistance" and informal assistance as "mutual
assistance").

2019]

FINANCING CR-ISIS

235

criminal cases. 2 4 At this time, the United States provided assistance
in foreign investigations through the judicial branch and tended to
rely on the issuance and receipt of letters rogatory between judicial
bodies in order to facilitate the exchange of information. 2 5 However,
courts and law enforcement agencies universally recognized that this
practice was-and continues to be-costly, time consuming, and
inefficient, and began to explore new avenues through which to
exchange information. 2 6 Effective MLA therefore naturally required
the creation of new vehicles for inter-agency communication and
transmission of investigative data.
B. The Development of Modern MLA Programs
Mechanisms for MLA in criminal cases have developed
concurrently with changing attitudes toward international law and
cooperation. Over the years, these mechanisms have taken many
forms, including the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters, the subsequently enacted Commonwealth Scheme,
and various other international conventions on criminal assistance. 2 7
Even today, mechanisms used to facilitate the exchange of evidence of
criminal activity come from a wide variety of sources. The most
common are treaties, executive agreements, and ad hoc agreements
between nations contingent on continued reciprocity, in addition to
auxiliary programs implemented by other international regulatory
and enforcement bodies. 2 8
Modern MLA regimes vary across the globe, but most commonly
and concretely take effect via treaty.2 9 These treaties typically

See Ellis & Pisani, supra note 13, at 193-94 (discussing the elimination of
24.
the "civil suit" and government interest requirements, and establishment of a
commission to propose means of improving foreign legal assistance).
25.
Letter of Request, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining letter
rogatory or letter of request as "a document issued by one court to a foreign court,
requesting that the foreign court (1) take evidence from a specific person within the
foreign jurisdiction or serve process on an individual or corporation within the foreign
jurisdiction and (2) return the testimony or proof of service for use in a pending case").
Ellis & Pisani, supra note 13, at 194-95.
26.
27.
See MCCLEAN, supra note 9, at 170-72, 179-81. The European Convention,
developed in 1959, was the first multilateral agreement in this area, with a focus on
flexibility for varying legal systems. The Commonwealth Scheme, on the other hand,
operated as a set of recommendations rather than binding obligations. Other previous
schemes laid the groundwork for the current system through the adoption of
requirements like the establishment of central information hubs, or justified grounds
for refusal.
28.
ANDREW K. WOODS, GLOB. NETWORK INITIATIVE, DATA BEYOND BORDERS:
MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN THE INTERNET AGE 13-14 (2015), https://csis-prod.s3.
amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy-files/files/attachments/150128_datareport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4PBA-VZPJ] (archived Nov. 4, 2018).
29.
Gail Kent, The Mutual Legal Assistance Problem Explained, STANFORD LAW
SCH.
CTR.
FOR
INTERNET
&
Soc'Y
(Feb.
23,
2015,
1:06
PM),

236

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 52:229

resemble something similar to the United Nations Model Treaty on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Model Treaty). 30 The Model
Treaty was promulgated in 1990 with the intent of providing a basis
for future negotiations between United Nations member states.3 1 As
such, it incorporates provisions from previous schemes, but runs
rather slim in terms of procedure, since it is intended to provide a
baseline on which nations can build. 32 The Model Treaty delineates
the scope of MLA-for example, its provisions do not extend to
extradition or custody proceedings-and provides grounds upon
which assistance may be refused.3 3
Prior to the development of the Model Treaty, the concept of
MILATs first began to filter into international discussions in the
1960s. 3 4 However, the United States refused to buy into the idea
until over a decade later, when its own criminal prohibitions were
implicated.3 5 The United States signed its first treaty on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters with Switzerland in 1973, after
learning that Swiss banking-secrecy provisions were being used to
conceal the evasion of American tax and security laws.3 6 Although
the United States capitulated to Switzerland's refusal to contravene
its strict financial privacy laws, the negotiations nonetheless led to a
complex, extensive treaty that would serve as the impetus for
additional similar future engagements. 3 7
Internationally, the use of the MLAT as a law enforcement tool
saw the most significant rise in popularity in the 1980s as a result of
concerns about the burgeoning international drug trade, terrorist
networks, and a general increase in global financial and white-collar
crime.3 8 The success of these treaties continues to be of vital
importance to law enforcement efforts aimed at detecting crime and
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/02/mutual-legal-assistance-problem-explained
[https://perma.cclW43L-3MZ7] (archived Oct. 29, 2017).
Id.; see, e.g., G.A. Res. 45/117, Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in
30.
Criminal Matters (Dec. 14, 1990); Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.K.U.S., Jan. 6, 1994, T.I.A.S. 96-1202 [hereinafter US-UK MIAT].
31.
MCCLEAN, supra note 9, at 185.
32.
Id. at 185-86.
33.
Id. at 186.
34.
Id. at 196-97.
35.
Id. at 196-97.
36.
Ellis & Pisani, supra note 13, at 196-97 (saying the treaty went into force in
1977); see Daniel Halvarsson, The Suspect and Mutual Legal Assistance: A Legal
Analysis of the Rights of the Individual in the Suppression of Transnational Organized
Crime 39-40 (Spring 2015) (unpublished Master's Thesis, Uppsala University),
http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:846157/FULLTEXTl.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DHR5-L2QTJ (archived Nov. 4, 2018) (noting older MLATs used to
contain exceptions for fiscal offenses or violations of bank secrecy rules, but these are
no longer grounds for refusal to comply with an MLAT request).
37.
See Ellis & Pisani, supra note 13, at 197-98.
MCCLEAN, supra note 9, at 154-55 (suggesting the development of mutual
38.
assistance has been in large part due to concerns "about the drugs trade, international
terrorism, and commercial crime").
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obtaining evidence of criminal activity that has no physical source or
exists solely within the bounds of the internet and financial records. 3 9
Over the next few decades following the ratification of the treaty with
Switzerland, the United States entered into several more similar
treaties with international allies. That number skyrocketed in 2010
when fifty-six new treaties between the United States and various
EU member states went into effect following post-9/11 negotiations,
reflecting the global focus on counterterrorism efforts and
international crime.40
C. OperationalizingMLA Treaties
These bilateral and multilateral treaties signify a commitment to
provide assistance to cosignatories in their respective ongoing
criminal investigations, so long as such assistance is consistent with
international and domestic laws. 4 1 Each treaty may describe general
operational terms, or may specify procedures for particular acts such
as the service of documents, gathering locally stored information,
taking witness testimony, or restraining or forfeiting assets linked to
criminal activity that are located abroad. 42 Operationalizing these
treaties is not so simple, however. Each side is usually required to
establish a central authority for receiving and processing both
incoming and outgoing requests. 4 3 In the United States, that
authority is the Office of International Affairs (OIA), located within
44
the DOJ's Criminal Division.
The process begins with a written request from the central
authority of one nation to that of another, both of which review the
request to ensure that it complies with treaty requirements and
domestic laws, including constitutions and founding documents as
well as legislative materials. 4 5 The request is then sent from the
central authority to the domestic law enforcement agency responsible

WOODS, supra note 28, at 3-4.
39.
Press Release, Dep't of Justice: Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S./EU Agreements
40.
on Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition Enter into Force (Feb. 1, 2010),
[https://perma.ce/J5CBhttp://www.justice.gov/opalpr/2010/February/10-opa-108.html
HR5S] (archived Nov. 11, 2017).
UNODC Manual, supra note 16, at 19.
41.
42.
See Ellis & Pisani, supra note 13, at 198 (laying out the broad categories of
assistance in criminal matters typically provided for by treaty).
43.
G.A. Res. 45/117, supra note 30, art. 3.
44.
DOJ BUDGET, supra note 9, at 25.
See Mark A. Rush & Jared A. Kephart, Lifting the Veil on the MLAT
45.
Process:A Guide to Understandingand Responding to MLA Requests, LEGAL INSIGHT
(K&L Gates), Jan. 20, 2017, at 4, http://m.klgates.com/files/Publication/66968ld7-12d7451e-8240-a33cf67c959flPresentation/PublicationAttachmentec5fc22d-3e3c-4607-bcb3f4e99e3f59b4/GEAlert_01202017.pdf [https://perma.cc/AR52-KZNA] (archived Nov. 6,
2018) (saying review for validity is governed by treaty requirements, the U.S.
Constitution, and statutory requirements for execution).
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for carrying it out. 4 6 In the United States, an incoming request would
be sent to OIA, which would then forward it to the appropriate U.S.
Attorney's Office after confirming regulatory compliance. 4 7 There, the
appropriate division would then transform it into a domestically
enforceable court order, and, once fulfilled, the desired information or
proof of completion of the request would be sent back to the central
authority of the country of origin through OIA. 4 8 As anyone familiar
with the American judicial system knows, this process necessarily
takes a significant amount of time, much to the dismay of law
enforcement both domestically and abroad. Outgoing requests from
the United States to other nations engage solely the executive branch,
unlike incoming ones, which involve both the executive and judicial
branches. 4 9 They are drafted by U.S. Attorneys during the course of
law enforcement investigations and approved by OIA before they are
sent abroad.5 0
Interestingly, because of the lack of contact with the judicial
branch, and the lack of constitutional protections for foreign citizens,
there is no method through which an individual affected by an MLAT
request from the United States may restrict its enforcement. 51
Because IIATs are exclusively for the benefit of governments, and
because of the general necessity of discretion in conducting criminal
investigations so as to avoid notice to the potential defendants,
subjects of MLAT requests rarely have notice of the action and
certainly have no standing to challenge it.5 2 The only barrier to entry
of the evidence into the record at trial is proof of compliance with the
Federal Rules of Evidence and of Criminal Procedure, which will be
discussed in more detail in a subsequent subpart. 5 3
Another wrinkle in the operation of the MLA system is the
prevalence of areas of the world that refuse to engage in bilateral

Kent, supra note 29.
46.
47.
Id.
48.
Id.
49.
Rush & Kephart, supra note 45, at 2-3.
50.
Id. at 3.
51.
Id. at 5 ("[B]ecause MLA requests are investigatory in nature, the target of
the investigation does not have a right to receive notice that the request has been filed.
. . . Similarly, the target ...
has no independent right to be heard regarding an MLA
request.").
52.
See In re Request from the U.K. Pursuant to the Treaty Between the Gov't
of the U.S. and the Gov't of the U.K. on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters in the
Matter of Dolours Price, 685 F.3d 1, 10-13 (1st Cir. 2012) (ruling MILATs do not give
rise to any judicially enforceable private rights of action to impede requests, to
suppress or exclude evidence, or to claim that a request was improper).
53.
See Rush & Kephart, supra note 45, at 3 ("[Elvidentiary protections remain
in place; that is, to be admissible in court, the evidence must still meet all of the
relevant requirements of the Federal Rules of Evidence.").
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MLATs. 54 This group of nations includes many African countries as
well as a handful of nations in the Middle East and Asia.5 5 Some of
these areas are more willing to engage in regional assistance, but
because of a lack of resources, lack of law enforcement infrastructure,
or skepticism about the potential costs and benefits of providing
assistance to foreign criminal investigations, they have yet to broadly
engage in treaties with the rest of the world. 5 6 Several of these areas
that do not maintain bilateral treaties with the rest of the globe have
engaged instead in regional MLA agreements in order to facilitate
cross-border investigations and resource sharing with their closest
neighbors. 5 7 However, there is no central communication hub for
each region to facilitate communication among regions, so each
regional agreement operates as an island, where the members
58
communicate with one another but not with non-member nations.
due to both
This complicates cross-regional investigations
decentralization and differing cultural and legal traditions in the
areas involved.5 9
D. Challenges of the Modern MLA Regime
Current mutual legal assistance as it exists in the United States
and throughout the world is sound in theory but problematic in
application. The main problems with MLA, and the use of requests
via MLAT in particular, arise in two general categories: structure and
operation. Treaties are multilateral agreements between nations, and
enforcement of such agreements typically depends in large part on
voluntary compliance with the terms of the treaty. 60 The enforcement
mechanisms offered by international bodies tend to lack teeth, as do
many other provisions of international law. 6 1 Additionally, the
processing and execution of requests requires a significant amount of

See, e.g., Int'l Ctr. for Transitional Justice, supra note 15 (showcasing the
54.
rarity of bilateral mutual legal assistance treaties in the Great Lakes Region, in
addition to challenges in enforcing even regional cooperation).
55.
See generally MLAT Index, MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATIES,
https://www.mlat.info/mlat-index (last visited Nov. 6, 2018) [https://perma.cc/4M5A667K] (archived Nov. 6, 2018) (listing the bilateral mutual legal assistance treaties in
effect; absent nations include: Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, and Libya).
See, e.g., Int'l Ctr. for Transitional Justice, supra note 15, at 5, 9.
56.
See Prost, supra note 8, at 98-99 (listing the most common regional mutual
57.
legal assistance agreements).
58.
See id. at 106 (Due to geographic limitations inherent in these agreements,
"they do not address cooperation between countries of different regions.").
59.
Id.
See id. at 122 ("[Mlutual assistance, even rendered pursuant to treaty, is of
60.
an inherently discretionary nature.").
Id.
61.
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resources while implicating the difficulties that come with trying to
cross language barriers and variations in legal systems.
1. Structural Deficiencies
The first structural barrier to effective MVLA is the lack of
accountability for refusal to comply with requests adequately or at
all. Refusals are generally governed by the provisions in the Model
Treaty, as well as those found in the United Nations Convention
Against Transnational Organized
Crime
(UNTOC
or the
Convention). 6 2 In Article 18, UNTOC requires signatories to the
Convention to provide written reasons for refusal. 6 3 Countries are
required to attempt to settle disputes through negotiation, but if that
is impossible within a reasonable time, the issues shall be submitted
to arbitration. 6 4 Parties then have six months to agree on terms of
the arbitration, after which either party may refer the dispute to the
International Court of Justice. 6 5 However, there is no requirement
that the nations do so and no punishment for noncommunication or
noncompliance. 6 6 Additionally, during ratification, nations may
declare that they do not consider themselves bound by the arbitration
requirements at all, at which point there is no additional remedy for
noncompliance. 6 7
Common justifications for failure to comply with MLA requests
include the ever-amorphous "national or public interest"; issues
surrounding punishment such as dual criminality or lack thereof,
double jeopardy, and severity of punishment; and privacy
considerations for both public and private actors. 6 8 States remain
wary of providing information to other nations, fearing that such
information may result in the prosecution of conduct that is not
criminalized in the country to which the request was sent, or of
excessive punishment, including capital punishment, all of which
raise additional human rights concerns. 6 9 In fact, many MILATs
require dual criminality of the conduct under investigation in order to

62.
See United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,
Nov. 15, 2000, 40 I.L.M. 335 [hereinafter UNTOC]; UNODC Manual, supra note 16, at
2 ("The [UNTOC] can be viewed as a model or blueprint for international cooperation
in extradition and mutual legal assistance."). There are 189 parties and 147 signatories
to the UNTOC. United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,
U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY
&mtdsg.no=XVIII-12&chapter=18&clang-_en
(last
visited
Nov.
6,
2018)
[https://perma.ccl3E2E-HSBF] (archived Nov. 6, 2018).
63.
UNTOC, supra note 62, art. 18, ¶ 23.
64.
Id. art. 15, IT 1-2.
65.
Id. ¶ 2.
66.
Id. ¶ 2-4.
67.
Id. ¶ 3.
68.
UNODC Manual, supra note 16, at 70-73.
69.
Kent, supra note 29.
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require a receiving country to comply with a request. 7 0 In the absence
of dual criminality, or if the request itself violates a constitutional
provision or another domestic law, the request will likely go
unfulfilled. Furthermore, although these problems are typically
thought to only impact legal relationships between nations of
disparate levels of development, recently conflicts between more
developed nations have arisen which have the potential to impact
international cooperation. 7 1
2. Operational Deficiencies
The current MLA regime also possesses significant operational
issues. The current process is incredibly inefficient, and receiving a
response to a request may take months. 72 This situation is also not
limited to the United States. In the UK, the average length of time
between the receipt of a request and completion of that request is
thirteen months.7 3 This is a function of both the number of requests
received by certain nations who have access to large amounts of
information, like the United States and the UK, and of the minimal
resources available to fill those requests. 74
Countries that must respond to many more requests than they
send tend to be less willing to funnel resources toward other nations'
law enforcement efforts and believe that they should receive more
international assistance toward the operation of their programs. 75 On
the other hand, nations who receive few requests are inclined to send
more and free-ride off the resources of foreign law enforcement
bodies. Inefficiency results not only due to resource disparities, but
also due to the massive increase in the number of requests issued
globally as electronic data becomes increasingly more important to

70.
See UNODC Manual, supra note 16, at 48 (saying the concept of dual
criminality requires that the offense at issue be "punishable under the domestic low of
both the requesting State Party and the requested State Party," based on the
underlying conduct and a standard of substantial similarity).
See Rebecca Shaeffer, A British Court Rules that Sending Defendants to the
71.
U.S. Prison System is a Human Rights Violation, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2018/02/07/a-british-courtrules-that-sending-defendants-to-the-u-s-prison-system-is-a-human-rightsviolation/?utm-campaign=buffer&utm-content=bufferc506d&utm-medium=social&ut
[https://perma.cc/KH5T-ZHLS]
m source-twitter.com&utm term=.61fec7l9ff3d
(archived Nov. 2, 2018) (detailing a conflict between American and British criminal
justice systems over whether extradition of an alleged hacker for prosecution in the
United States would constitute a human rights violation given the characteristics of
the American carceral system).
72.
WOODS, supra note 28, at 3.
73.
Kent, supra note 29.
WOODS, supra note 28, at 3, 10.
* 74.
75.
See UNODC Manual, supra note 16, at 85 ("[T]he ordinary costs of
executing a request will be borne by the [receiving] State.").
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criminal investigations. 7 6 In 2015, OIA had a backlog of more than
twelve thousand MLA requests pending resolution, and that number
is expected to continue to grow. 7 7 OIA attorneys currently operate at
a capacity of nearly three times the caseload determined to be
"manageable" by the DOJ, due to the large increase in number of
requests and an overall lack of staff and budgetary resources. 7 8 Given
the rise in electronic-data requests, the current caseload per attorney
is the result of an 81 percent increase from the estimated caseload in

2008.79
The amount of data stored on the internet and held by service
providers headquartered in the United States-in Silicon Valley, in
particular-has contributed significantly to the massive increase in
the number of MLA requests sent to the United States.8 0 The United
States has become the most natural place to send these requests,
given its broad jurisdiction, just as the UK is subject to a significant
number of requests for information from global financial institutions.
When it comes to execution of these requests by courts and U.S.
Attorneys' Offices, the DOJ has recognized that Assistant U.S.
Attorneys often put off executing MLA requests in their districts in
favor of addressing cases they deem more pressing, which only
81
further increases the backlog.
This issue is further complicated by the fact that there is no
uniform "MLAT Request Form" or similar instrument, resulting in
the need for OIA to continuously review each request to determine
whether or not it complies with both treaty requirements and the
receiving country's legal requirements.8 2 The location of the central
point of contact within the government also varies among nations,
resulting in a lack of uniformity in transmission that only further
delays the execution of requests.8 3 Potential reforms that have been
put forward to address these concerns are aimed at uniformity in
both request and response. Many scholars also advocate for the
creation of an electronic system through which countries may respond
to and track requests, as well as increased financial resources for the
international MLA regime and subsequent proportional distribution
84
to ensure the system's continued functionality and consistency.

76.
Kent, supra note 29 ("[A]s the number of requests for international
communications data goes up . . . [flew countries, including the US, have increased the
resources provided to Central Authorities.").
77.
DOJ BUDGET, supra note 9, at 25-26.
78.
Id. at 26.
79.
Id.
80.
See DOJ BUDGET, supra note 9, at 24; Kent, supra note 29.
81.
DOJ BUDGET, supra note 9, at 25.
82.
WOODS, supra note 28, at 10.
83.
Id. at 13.
84.
Id. at 10-11.
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Because of the many issues inherent in this process, prosecutors
must naturally be aware of other ways to obtain information critical
to their investigations. In a subsequent Part, this Note will discuss
the potential for extraterritorial action, but it should be noted that
such a refusal to engage in the formal process poses a significant
obstacle to the successful operation and reform of MLA.
Law enforcement organizations-particularly in the United
States-also face concerns about the admissibility of evidence
obtained through the MLA process. In certain nations, only data
obtained through MILA is admissible, while others, such as the United
States, must comply with domestic rules of evidence and criminal
procedure. 85 The American Federal Rules of Evidence require that
prosecutors take significant steps to authenticate evidence before it
can be admitted into the record at trial, which may be difficult in
practice due to geographic distance, the feasibility of acquiring a
witness 'or the lack thereof, and language barriers. 8 6 Additionally,
most countries have no special evidentiary laws governing electronic
evidence, which poses problems in determining ownership and
accuracy of the machine that produced the data for the request, or the
potential for human error in compiling that data.8 7 If foreign nations
fail to comply with the requirements submitted with the request in
order to render the evidence admissible at trial, law enforcement has
no avenue through which to resolve the issue absent issuing another
MLAT request.
In terms of criminal procedure, it should be noted that recent
jurisprudence has suggested that criminal procedure requirements
may be more lax in the United States, where the traditional remedy
for constitutional violations-the exclusion of the wrongfully acquired
evidence-does not apply to searches and seizures conducted by
foreign law enforcement.8 8 Further, requests submitted through
domestic mechanisms like the Stored Communications Act (SCA) may
result in obtaining a copy of data stored overseas, but have been held
to not implicate any sort of Fourth Amendment concern given the
location of the data and the sufficiency of the SCA request as a
warrant.8 9 While the treaty or request may outline procedures the

Anna-Maria Osula, Mutual Legal Assistance & Other Mechanisms for
85.
Accessing ExtraterritoriallyLocated Data, 9 MAsARYK U. J.L. & TECH. 43, 50-51 (2015).
86.
Kenneth N. Rashbaum et al., Admissibility of Non-U.S. Electronic Evidence,
18 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 7-10 (2012).
U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, COMPREHENSIVE STUDY ON CYBERCRIME
87.
167 (2013), https://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/UNODCCCPCJEG.4_
(archived
[https://perma.cc/2JYU-EFDK]
2013/CYBERCRIMESTUDY_210213.pdf
Nov. 7, 2019).
See, e.g., United States v. Getto, 729 F.3d 221, 231 (2d Cir. 2013); United
88.
States v. Mount, 757 F.2d 1315, 1318 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
89.
See, e.g., In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and
Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197, 223 (2d Cir. 2016), vacated, No. 17-2
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issuing country wishes to be followed, such procedures are often
voluntary rather than mandatory, as is compliance with the treaty.
E. MLA in the Context of InternationalFinancialCrime and
Terrorism
Despite the difficulties attendant to its operation, the acquisition
of information through MLA remains a critical law enforcement tool
in combating global terrorist networks and other international
crime.9 0 Two areas of crime that have proven the most difficult to
track and effectively prosecute are (1) the financing and operation of
terrorist networks like ISIS, and (2) the money laundering
organizations that often accompany them.9 1 Both areas of criminal
activity rely heavily on fraudulent front companies, often called shell
companies or corporations, which cannot be traced to a single
individual and whose only tangible element may be a post-office box
or a web address. 92 These companies may regularly engage in
legitimate operations but also problematically serve as vehicles
through which to discreetly transfer illegally obtained funds without
raising the suspicion of law enforcement. 9 3 However, their efforts are
not limited to seedy shell corporations, but may also engage
legitimate businesses and websites without their knowledge. 9 4 Just
last year, an FBI investigation revealed that ISIS had been using
fake eBay sales to mask payments to foreign operatives, including
those made to an individual located in the United States.9 5
Modern terrorist organizations depend in large part on broad,
discreet networks of global financing. 9 6 Other characteristics of
modern terrorism which make it more difficult to track and dismantle
include flexible organization structures, decentralization, and a focus
(U.S. Apr. 17, 2017) [hereinafter Microsoft Case] ("Those requirements are consistent
with the highest level of protection ordinarily required by the Fourth Amendment for
the issuance of search warrants"); In re Search of Information Associated with
[Redacted]@gmail.com That Is Stored at Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., 2017 WL
3445634, No. 16-MJ-00757 (BAH), at *10, *16 (D.D.C. 2017) [hereinafter Google Case]
(holding that warrants issued pursuant to the SCA are sufficient to meet the privacy
protections intended by the Fourth Amendment).
90.
DOJ BUDGET, supra note 9, at 22 (proposing reform of the current system
because "[i]nternational and domestic criminals and terrorists use the internet
regularly to carry out their illicit activities.").
91.
Id. (saying "[1]aw enforcement authorities around the world struggle to keep
pace with criminals' use of the internet for crime that go beyond cybercrime," earlier
described as terrorists and use of the internet to advance physical crimes.).
92.
Shima Baradaran et al., Funding Terror, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 482-83
(2014).
93.
Id. at 482.
94.
See, e.g., Feliz Solomon, ISIS Used eBay to Send Money to a U.S. Operative,
Investigators Say, TIME (Aug. 11, 2017), http://time.com/4896684/islamic-state-ebaypaypall [https://perma.cc/R8R9-H9N6] (archived Nov. 7, 2018).
Id.
95.
96.
Baradaran et al., supra note 92, at 482.

2019]

FINANCING CR-ISIS

245

on organized crime as the vehicle through which to obtain funds,
rather than direct links to state entities.9 7 The methods through
which such organizations are funded is generally known as threat or
terror finance. Threat finance, defined as "the means and methods
used by organizations to finance operations and activities that pose a
threat to U.S. national security," includes donations, funneling of
funds through shell corporations, and funds obtained through
criminal activity like extortion and fraud. 9 8 Through the use of
constantly shifting shell corporations and money laundering tactics,
or even legitimate donations, these organizations anonymously funnel
money through institutions across their network while ensuring that
such transactions appear clean.9 9 While assets involved in money
laundering are inherently the proceeds of criminal activity, funds
involved in terror finance schemes may be funneled through perfectly
and
organizations
sources,
like
nongovernmental
legitimate
charities.1 0 0 Because these terrorist organizations are international
in nature, any effort to combat their financing through legitimate
financial institutions necessitates international cooperation and
broad dissemination of information among concurrent criminal
investigations.
Currently, that international law enforcement cooperation
hinges on the MLA regime, and the operation of various regulatory
and enforcement bodies aimed at monitoring the activities of financial
institutions. The DOJ has identified reform to the MLA regime
present in the United States as critical to global law enforcement
efforts to combat terrorism and international crime. 10 1 While the
number of MLA requests received by OIA increased by 85 percent
since 2000, the number of data requests within that subset has
02
increased by over 1,000 percent.1
The United States and the rest of the international community
also use regulatory and enforcement mechanisms run by various
international and domestic bodies to combat terror finance. The
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), composed of thirty-five member
jurisdictions, was established in 1989 with the goal of promulgating

97.
Larissa Van Den Herik & Nico Schrijver, The Fragmented International
Legal Response to Terrorism, in COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGIES IN A FRAGMENTED
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, supranote 8, at 1, 5-7.
98.
Threat Finance and Financial Intelligence, AM. SEC. PROJECT,
https://www.americansecurityproject.org/asymmetric-operations/threat-finance-andfinancial-intelligence/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2018) [https://perma.ccl2ALS-HVBD]
(archived Nov. 7, 2017).
99.
Baradaran et al., supra note 92, at 488.
100. See Tim Daniel, International Cooperation in Counteracting Terrorist
Financing, in COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGIES IN A FRAGMENTED INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER, supra note 8, at 240, 245.
101. DOJ BUDGET, supra note 9, at 22.
102. Id. at 23.
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measures through which to combat money laundering, terror finance,
and other related international financial crime. 10 3 FATF standards
require financial institutions to monitor transactions for suspicious
activity and report such activity to the relevant government
authorities, who then make recommendations to law enforcement on
whether to begin an investigation.1 0 4
The United States also relies heavily on the Office of Foreign
Asset Control (OFAC) and the Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network (FinCEN), both of which are domestic institutions situated
within the Department of the Treasury and are used to enforce
international sanctions and monitor financial activity in efforts to
stop money laundering and threat finance through domestic action as
well as cooperation with their foreign counterparts.1 0 5 Although
these institutions seem neutral on their face, they also come with
their own set of enforcement problems, especially given the amount of
discretion that rests with financial institutions on what activity to
report. Particularly when it comes to the filing of suspicious activity
reports, financial institutions are given broad latitude in how to
determine what makes a transaction "suspicious." 10 6 Unfortunately,
this discretion has historically resulted in banks electing to file
reports based on political characteristics, using proxies like race, age,
ethnicity, and religion in order to sort through transactions, which
surrounding
stereotypes
existing
perpetuates
only further
international crime and makes it more difficult to catch criminals
who do not fit those characteristics. 10 7

III. ANALYSIS

The MLA regime currently in place has had significant impacts,
both positive and negative, on domestic and international efforts to
fight terrorist financing networks and global money laundering. Law
enforcement agencies are either forced to work within the system or
find sufficient alternatives, which has led to the development of new

103. FATF Members, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/
countries/#FATF (last visited Nov. 7, 2018) [https://perma.cclJ6NX-3RT2] (archived
Nov. 2, 2018).
104. Richard Gordon, Terrorism Financing Indicatorsfor FinancialInstitutions
in the United States, 44 CASE W. RES. J. IN'L L. 765, 769 (2011).
105. Office of Foreign Assets Control - Sanctions Programs and Information, U.S.
DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Pages/
default.aspx (last visited Nov. 7, 2018) [https://perma.cc/RG87-RF43] (archived Nov. 2,
2018); What We Do, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, https://www.fincen.gov/
what-we-do (last visited Nov. 7, 2018) [https://perma.cclZ3U3-KGSM] (archived Nov. 2,
2018).
106. See Laura K. Donohue, Constitutional and Legal Challenges to the AntiTerrorism FinanceRegime, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 643, 695 (2008).
107. Id.
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law enforcement tools both domestically and abroad that raise
potential extraterritoriality concerns-particularly when it comes to
the recent trend in the United States to go after international assets
via domestic forfeiture laws. Further, because of the number of actors
necessarily involved in the MLA process, conflict has arisen within
and among entities responsible for carrying out the requests and
those pursuing international criminal investigations.
A. Potentialfor ExtraterritorialAction and Action Outside MLA
Given the inefficiencies inherent in the MLA process and the
difficulties of translating or otherwise authenticating evidence
received, law enforcement agencies have sought to acquire
information through more informal channels of communication. 10 8
While this may take the form of police-to-police channels or judicial
and prosecutorial cooperation, 109 it also may take place through
extraterritorial action. 1 10 While extraterritorial action may certainly
be faster than the formal process, it also risks disrupting
international norms by disrupting nations' domestic laws and
effectively replacing them with foreign ones. This Part will discuss
the most common and controversial routes taken by law enforcement,
particularly within the United States, that may be viewed by other
nations as extraterritorial action.
1. Correspondent Banking Relationships and the Global Financial
System
As discussed previously, threat finance networks rely heavily on
the global financial system in order to disguise the sources and
destinations of their funds and to ensure cohesive operation of
criminal networks worldwide.11 1 Due to this relationship, criminal
investigations related to threat finance often rely on determinations
appear
that certain transactions
by financial institutions
suspicious.1 12 Financial institutions play a critical role in identifying
potential sources of criminal activity, providing data about those
sources, and eventually, in enforcing judgments levied against them.

108. See Prost, supra note 8, at 94-95.
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., Corey J. Smith, Obtaining Foreign Evidence Outside of the Mutual
Legal Assistance Treaty Process, 55 U.S. Arr'YS' BULL. 27, 27 (2007) (suggesting the
United States may "move to compel the United States person with signatory authority
over the evidence in question to consent to its production").
111. See Daniel, supra note 100, at 245 (saying terrorists receive financing from
sources like donations, diversion of funds, legitimate businesses, fraud schemes, and
organized crime).
112. See Donohue, supranote 106, at 673.
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A brief explanation of their operations is key to understanding the
course of transnational criminal investigations.
The global financial system has grown to rely extensively on
correspondent banking relationships, in which a bank maintains an
account with a foreign financial institution in order to facilitate the
provision of services on behalf of their clients within that jurisdiction
without expending the resources to open up their own branch in every
potential place their clients may wish to do business.1 1 3 Financial
institutions are expected to comply with rigorous customer due
diligence and monitoring requirements in connection with the
maintenance of these relationships and these requirements are
tailored to the level of risk posed by each foreign institution and its
clients. 11 4 The cost of this compliance has resulted in a downward
trend in the number of correspondent banking relationships
maintained with American financial institutions. 1 15 According to
some authors, it also has resulted in the further exclusion of many
people from both developed and developing countries from accessing
the global financial system-a broad concept which includes
everything from credit, insurance, and savings accounts to other
financial services.1 1 6 In addition to excluding individuals, the strict
application of international regulations has also led to the exclusion
of small businesses, thus limiting competition and economic
development at the local level and more broadly.1 17
Furthermore, engagement in a correspondent bank relationship
with a US institution brings that foreign institution and its accounts
under the jurisdiction of OFAC and the United States as a whole,
which is a significant concern for foreign banks and clients,
considering the strictness of American financial regulations.1 1 8

113. Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury and Federal Banking
Agencies Joint Fact Sheet on Foreign Correspondent Banking (Aug. 30, 2016),
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/Foreign%20
[https://perma.cc/M3GV-H3L6]
Correspondent%20Banking%20Fact%2OSheet.pdf
(archived Nov. 2, 2018) [hereinafter DOT Press Release]; Correspondent Bank,
(last
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/correspondent-bank.asp
INVESTOPEDIA
visited Nov. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/QQ3Z-JUWH] (archived Nov. 2, 2018).
114. DOT Press Release, supra note 113.
115. Recent Trends in Correspondent Banking Relationships: Further
Considerations,INT'L MONETARY FuND (Apr. 21, 2017), http://www.imf.org/en/
Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2017/04/2 1/recent-trends-in-correspondent-bankingrelationships-further-considerations [https://perma.cc/U8XA-45Y2] (archived Nov. 2,
2018) [hereinafter IMF Recent Trends].
116. Walter P. Loughlin, Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorist Financing, and
the Global Banking System Three Anomalies, F. PUB. POL'Y: J. OXFORD ROUND TABLE,
at 1, 9 (Spring 2012).
117. Id. at 1.
118. See IMF Recent Trends, supra note 115, at 23 (explaining recent highprofile enforcement in the United States may have significantly affected banks' risk
tolerance and subsequent willingness to engage in correspondent banking
relationships).
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Because of this jurisdiction, American courts then have another
avenue through which to issue subpoenas for financial records, which
tend to result in a quicker, more reliable response than a lengthy
MLAT request.' 1 9 This necessarily opens the door for what could be
seen as extraterritorial action on the part of the United States to
avoid engaging in requests pursuant to treaty obligations, and may
not be viewed favorably by nations whose legal systems are being
subverted in this way.
2. Action Based on Domestic Law
Efforts to combat threat finance may also be channeled purely
through domestic law. In 2007, the Executive Office for U.S.
Attorneys issued a notice through a bulletin on extraterritorial issues
that laid out avenues through which to seek information outside of
the MLA process. 12 0 These avenues included letters rogatory, Bank of
Nova Scotia 1 2 1 or PATRIOT Act subpoenas, and issuing compelled
consent orders to parties subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States. 12 2 These avenues may be preferable to use of the MLA regime
in certain fast-moving cases involving the internet or financial
institutions, particularly when coupled with evidentiary concerns.
However, they also necessarily entail subversion of international
treaty obligations and risk encouraging the manufacture of
jurisdiction over global corporations and technology providers.
Additionally, recent judicial precedent in the United States has
addressed the jurisdictional question in a unique way in the situation
of technology network providers. 12 3 Instead of using time-consuming

119. Smith, supra note 110, at 30 (Under the PATRIOT Act, a prosecutor may,
with the approval of the Attorney General, issue a subpoena to "any foreign bank that
maintains a correspondent account in the United States.").
120. Id. at 27. During my summer legal internship at the U.S. Attorney's Office
for the District of Columbia, prosecutors tended to choose other investigative tools over
mutual legal assistance requests due to the length of time it usually took for MLAT
requests to be fulfilled.
121. This term refers to "Bank of Nova Scotia" subpoenas-a type of subpoena
used to obtain bank or business records located abroad through serving a subpoena on
the enterprise's American branch or office, named for the case in which they were
upheld as permissible by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. See In Re
Grand Jury Proceedings Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817 (11th Cir.); see also, U.S.
Dep't
of
Justice
Criminal
Resource
Manual,
CRM
201-279,
https://www.justice.gov/jm/criminal-resource-manual-279-subpoenas (last visited Nov.
8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/G3Y7-99YU] (archived Nov. 2, 2018) (laying out the
Department of Justice's guide for subpoenas).
122. Smith, supra note 110, at 27-30.
123. Nina Totenberg, Court Seems Unconvinced Of Microsoft's Argument To
2018)
(Feb.
27,
NPR
Stored
Overseas,
Email
Data
Shield
https://www.npr.org/2018/02/27/584650612/new-front-in-data-privacy-at-the-supremecourt-can-u-s-seize-emails-stored-abroad [https://perma.cc/9K9T-CDQ2 ] (archived Nov.
2, 2018) (discussing recent precedent in the lower court cases regarding Microsoft and
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MLAT requests in order to access data stored on international servers
owned by companies like Google and Microsoft, recently prosecutors
have sought to access the data domestically through SCA requests. 12 4
Companies have previously subverted the jurisdictional requirement
of the SCA by storing data in bits in multiple locations at once or in a
constantly shifting cloud, thus being unable to identify the exact
location of any piece of data at any given time. 12 5 This method of
storing data intentionally subverted any possibility of obtaining it via
either domestic or international action. 12 6
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that the use of the SCA warrant violated the
presumption against extraterritorial
action and thus was
impermissible, and that the government should seek the evidence
through an MLAT request to the country where the server is
located-in this case, Ireland. 12 7 Contrarily, because Google in
particular stores its data in "shards" and thus the contents of one
email or one account can be held all over the world simultaneously,
the District Court for the District of Columbia approved of the SCA
method, and refused to permit Google to avoid the legal process
through the use of creative data storage methods. 12 8 The former case
was heard before the Supreme Court, but the Court was never able to
issue a ruling on the merits of the action.
In March 2018, Congress passed, and the president signed, a
massive budget bill containing a provision entitled the Clarifying
Lawful Overseas Use of Data, or CLOUD, Act. 12 9 This Act permits
the use of SCA warrants to reach overseas data-in particular,
requiring "email service providers to disclose emails within their
'possession, custody, or control,' even when those emails are located
outside the United States."1 3 0 As a result, the federal government
was able to obtain and serve an updated warrant, mooting the issue
before the Supreme Court and invalidating the Second Circuit's
ruling finding the warrant impermissible. 13 1
Google, as well as the implications of United States v. Carpenter for cellular data,
which is also pending decision by the Supreme Court).
124. See generally In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled
and Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197, 223 (2d Cir. 2016), vacated, No. 17-2
(U.S.
Apr.
17,
2017); In re Search of Information Associated with
[Redactedl@gmail.com That Is Stored at Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., 2017 WL
3445634, No. 16-MJ-00757 (BAH), at *10, *16 (D.D.C. 2017).
125. See Totenberg, supra note 123.
126. See id.
127. See generally Microsoft Case, 829 F.3d 197.
128. See generally Google Case, 2017 WL 3445634.
129. Amy Howe, Judges officially declare Microsoft email case moot,
SCOTUSBLOG (April 17, 2018, 11:12 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/04/justicesofficially-declare-microsoft-email-case-moot/ [https://perma.cc/6GGW-DL99] (archived
Nov. 4, 2018). See generally CLOUD Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2523 (2018).
130. Howe, supra note 129 (citing CLOUD Act, supra note 129).
131. Id.
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The CLOUD Act also notably contains a provision permitting the
execution of so-called executive agreements to streamline data
production through bilateral agreements with foreign states, provided
the state has sufficient data protections in place.1 3 2 The adequacy of
data protections is determined by a statutory balancing test of factors
such as compliance with the Convention on Cybercrime, a treaty
aimed at international cooperation established in 2001 to which the
United States is a party.1 3 3 However, given the time that has passed
since the establishment of the Convention on Cybercrime's protocols,
and the refusal of the United States to adopt the Additional Protocol
to the Convention on Cybercrime,1 34 these agreements may not be as
attractive to foreign nations as the US government may hope.
Congressional authorization of the use of the SCA warrant as a
permissible way to obtain data from global cloud-based technology
providers raises the potential for significant backlash by foreign
governments and businesses.1 3 5 Given the wide disparity in data
privacy protections for individuals in the United States and the EU,
in particular, foreign governments likely do not feel that they can rely
on the United States to adequately protect that data.1 36 The law also
permits foreign law enforcement entities to collect and intercept wire
communications from US companies without obtaining a US warrant,
further supporting the notion that the US government cares very
little about data privacy-even for its own citizens. 1 37 The CLOUD
Act therefore implicates the same international conflict over data
privacy concerns.' 3 8

132. 18 U.S.C. § 2523.
133. Id.; See generally Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 11, 2001, E.T.S. No. 185.
134. Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, concerning the
criminalisation of acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer
systems, opened for signature Jan. 28, 2003, E.T.S. No. 189 (entered into force Jan. 3,
2006) (providing for the criminalization of racist or xenophobic acts committed through
computer systems).
135. See Selena Larson & Lydia DePillis, Microsoft argues data privacy case is
one for Congress to decide, CNN (Feb. 28, 2018, 3:18 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/
02/27/technology/microsoft-data-privacy-arguments-supreme-court/index.html
[https://perma.cc/5DUC-JJEK] (archived Nov. 4, 2018) (expecting a backlash from the
EU due to cultural and legal privacy norms and higher expectation of respect for
individual privacy rights).
136. See Press Release, Court of Justice of the Eur. Union, The Court of Justice
Declares that the Commission's U.S. Safe Harbour Decision is Invalid, Case C-362/14,
Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner (Oct. 6, 2015) (invalidating the
Safe Harbor provision, thus holding that U.S. data protections are not adequate to
justify transfer of personal data to the U.S. from the EU).
137. CLOUD Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b) (2018); David Ruiz, Responsibility
Deflected, the CLOUD Act Passes, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Mar. 22, 2018),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/03/responsibility-deflected-cloud-act-passes
[https://perma.ce/72TN-UFDE] (archived Nov. 5, 2018).
138. Ellen Nakashima, Supreme Court to hear Microsoft case: A question of law
and borders, WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
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On the other hand, international reticence to enter into these
executive agreements with the United States could be the final push
to force Congress to take efforts to reform the domestic MLA process.
Importantly, the act itself applies specifically and narrowly to
"provider[s] of electronic communication service[s] or remote
computing service[s]."1 3 9 Absent reform of the MLA process,
counterterrorism investigations will likely be stuck with the current
system for global financial data, regardless of their newfound ability
to circumvent the system for email and telephone data. Therefore,
Congress will either be forced to reform the current system or enact
additional domestic legislation that may further incense international
opponents of extraterritorial action.
3. Asset Forfeiture Actions
Domestic law may also be used to effectuate judgements
internationally through the use of forfeiture law. The use of domestic
criminal prohibitions in conjunction with forfeiture actions is
beneficial in the realm of terror finance and counterterrorism because
such actions help prevent terrorist acts, reinforce state legitimacy by
providing due process and constitutional protections, and prevent
individuals from being able to cast themselves as "heroes" for the
cause, as they might in response to military action. 1 40 Highly
controversial, asset forfeiture laws are used to dispossess criminals of
the benefits and instrumentalities of their illegal activities, and,
similarly to threat finance efforts, to disrupt criminal networks. 1 4 1
MLATs commonly contain provisions for international assistance in
forfeiture proceedings, allowing foreign central authorities to freeze
or seize international assets held by individuals subject to domestic
criminal judgments.1 4 2
According to Congress, the deposit of funds into a foreign bank
that maintains a correspondent banking relationship with an
American bank qualifies as a deposit of funds into that entity's
correspondent bank account, thus rendering those funds subject to
seizure and forfeiture in subsequent criminal proceedings.1 4 3 When
funds are seized from a correspondent bank account, the foreign
financial institution is responsible for subsequently closing the
national-security/supreme-court-case-centers-on-law-enforcement-access-to-data-heldoverseas/2018/02/25/756f7ce8-la2f-11e8-b2d9-08e748f892cOstory.html?utmterm=.
8b9e8c3dcdbe [https://perma.cc/N57K-3LM9] (archived Dec. 5, 2018).
139. 18 U.S.C. § 2713 (2018).
140. Du Plessis, supra note 23, at 35-36.
141. Asset Forfeiture, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/white-collar-crime/
asset-forfeiture (last visited Nov. 9, 2018) [https://perma.cc/ZMA3-HKDJ] (archived
Nov. 4, 2018).
142. See, e.g., US-UK MILAT, supra note 30, art. 16 (discussing assistance in
forfeiture proceedings).
143. Loughlin, supra note 116, at 4.
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domestically held account of the individual connected with criminal
activity and reclaiming the funds for itself. Naturally, this system
discourages foreign banks from establishing relationships with
American institutions due to the potential damage to their reputation
in the countries in which they must close accounts and the possible
difficulties with what is essentially domestic enforcement of a foreign
nation's criminal penalties. 14 4
Recently, the United States has also begun to explore the
potential of using forfeiture actions and money judgments as methods
through which to seize funds connected with terrorist activity. In July
2017, craft store Hobby Lobby agreed to a $3 million dollar fine and
the forfeiture of more than a million dollars' worth of Iraqi
antiquities; these antiquities were likely looted by less-thanreputable sources, and were then smuggled into the United States
using false customs declarations of which the corporation was
aware. 14 5 In addition, as described at the outset of this Note, the
United States is exploring the possibility of civil forfeiture as an
avenue through which to effect counterterrorism objectives.1 4 6 Civil
forfeiture has been suggested by some scholars as an underutilized
method through which to combat threat finance as a necessary
corollary action to the acquisition of financial data, particularly
where individual prosecution is difficult or impossible. 14 7
These types of actions directly impose monetary punishments,
potentially on foreign actors, without necessarily engaging the MILA
process. However, the MLA process only discusses the exchange of
information and stops short of addressing any sort of cooperation
regarding final judgments beyond cooperation according to the
prosecuting nation's domestic laws. 14 8 Thus, when the United States
enforces a money judgment against a financial institution in place of
an individual or against an individual themselves, that money is
disposed of according to domestic forfeiture laws. These laws in the
United States allow funds seized pursuant to federal law to be used
for domestic "law enforcement purposes" and contain no provision on
sharing those funds with other nations with a stake in the

144. See id. at 8-9.
145. Richard Gonzales, Hobby Lobby To Forfeit Smuggled IraqiAntiquities, NPR
(July 5, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/07/05/535698988/hobbylobby-to-forfeit-smuggled-iraqi-antiquities [https://perma.ce/348C-46JS] (archived Nov.
4, 2018).
146. See generally United States' Verified Complaint for Forfeiture in Rem at 2,
United States v. One Gold Ring with Carved Gemstone, an Asset of ISIL, Discovered
on Electronic Media of Abu Sayyaf, President of ISIL Antiquities Department
[hereinafter One Gold Ring], No. 1:16-CV-02442 (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 2016) (seeking the
forfeiture of assets linked to the Islamic State (ISIS)); United States' Amended Verified
Complaint for Forfeiture in Rem at 10, One Gold Ring, No. 1:16-CV-02442 (D.D.C. Dec.
6, 2017) (seeking assets through an arrest in rem).
147. See Daniel, supra note 100, at 277-79.
148. See, e.g., US-UK MLAT, supra note 30, art. 16.
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investigation. 14 9 Although there are domestic provisions for
"equitable sharing," by which law enforcement agencies engaged in
joint investigations share in forfeited assets, US enforcement of these
provisions tends to be focused on either state law or on receiving
funds from other nations rather than sharing its own. 150
Furthermore, the effectiveness of forfeiture actions as a vehicle
through which to combat terrorism and terror finance has been
questioned.1 5
B. Conflict Among and Within Enforcement Bodies
MILA networks that operate through treaties and international
or domestic enforcement bodies naturally present situations of
potential conflict. This conflict may materialize either through
variation in legal systems among nations or through the exclusion or
inclusion of certain member states. Networks like the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the FATF
have been criticized for their lack of transparency and accountability
for the policy decisions they make, particularly since these decisions
occur outside the democratic process but have domestic effect. 15 2
Further criticisms have centered on exclusion of the countries
targeted by enforcement policies from the decision-making process,
usurpation of policy-making power from democratic governments, and
differential (sometimes favorable) treatment of their own member
states. 15 3 For example, within the United States, as of June 2016 not
a single domestic charity had been blacklisted as a potential vehicle
for terror finance since 2009, even though charities are a commonly
known target of terrorist organizations.1 5 4 Potential inadequacies in

149. See 28 U.S.C. § 524(c) (2015) (limiting use of assets in the Asset Forfeiture
Fund to specified "law enforcement purposes," including paying expenses incurred by
investigations, storage fees for forfeited assets, overtime pay, and training costs for
officers); Ellis & Pisani, supra note 13, at 212 (detailing MILAT provisions requiring
assets to be turned over to the requesting state, but nothing further).
150. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE: BUREAU FOR INT'L NARCOTICS & LAW ENF'T
AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT: VOLUME II: MONEY
LAUNDERING AND FINANCIAL CRIMES 21-23 (2014), https://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/222880.pdf [https://perma.ce/RZ8Z-ZN8L] (archived Dec. 5, 2018).
151. See RAPHAEL PERL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33160, COMBATING
TERRORISM: THE CHALLENGE OF MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS 2-3 (2007) (noting that
even the seizure of terrorist funds may not indicate progress toward eradicating
terrorism, since this may not affect the terrorists' ability to raise additional financing
for expansion).
152. Bruce Zagaris, InternationalEnforcement Law Trends for 2010 and Beyond:
Can the Cops Keep Up With the Criminals?, 34 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 1, 23
(2011).
153. Id. at 23-24.
154. Stopping the Money Flow: The War on Terror Finance: Joint Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade of the Comm. on Foreign
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the systems of member states might not result in economic sanctions
via blacklisting, while similar systems in nonmember states might
result in significant punishment.1 5 5
The FATF has stated that of the 194 countries with anti-terror
financing laws, only thirty-three of those nations have ever reported a
conviction under those laws, and thus others may not be enforcing
them as rigorously as their counterparts.1 56 Furthermore,
punishment for noncompliance with these and other regulations
aimed at combatting international financial crime tends to be
significantly more rigorous on noncompliant entities located in
nations excluded from the decision-making process. 1 5 7 The Egmont
Group is known to slow down international transactions for certain
institutions such that it is nearly impossible for those institutions to
clear funds through other countries. 15 8
laundering
and
anti-money
The
anti-terror
financing
frameworks in place and monitored by the FATF are also interesting
in that they impose very heavy costs on financial institutions, both
through reporting requirements and through penalties assessed for
noncompliance. 15 9 These regulations have resulted in banks facing
civil liability for failure to prevent the flow of funds used in
international crime through their institutions. 16 0 This disciplinary
framework assigns liability primarily based on the assumption that,
monitoring policies, financial
of know-your-customer
because
institutions "should have known" that criminal activity was taking
16 1
place involving their clients and accounts.
Even within the Treasury Department, the US government has
experienced inefficiency and conflict among enforcement institutions.
The United States has no comprehensive policy across agencies to
combat terror finance, resulting in variation in policy and priority
across enforcement bodies. 16 2 Without the creation of a consistent

Affairs and the Subcomm. on Emerging Threats and Capabilities of the Comm. on
Armed Services H. of Rep., 114th Cong. 2 (2016) [hereinafter Stopping the Money Flow].
155. Zagaris, supranote 152, at 23-24.
156. Stopping the Money Flow, supra note 154.
157. Zagaris, supra note 152, at 23.
158. See Michael Levi & Peter Reuter, Money Laundering, 34 CRIME & JUST. 289,
291 (2006) ("Since 1999, there has been a formal process for imposing economic
sanctions on countries that do not play their part, by slowing down their international
transactions and making it almost impossible for their banks to clear funds through
other countries.").
159. See Loughlin, supra note 116, at 6 (describing the mission as imposing
heavy costs on banks alleged to have customers aiding terrorist groups).
160. See id. ("[T]he procedures banks have implemented to combat terrorist
financing are now being turned against them as a basis for claims that the banks have
legal liability for the very terrorist violence they have sought to prevent and detect.").
161. See id. at 11 (litigation holding banks liable argues "that the banks 'should
have known' of alleged terrorist use of bank facilities .... .").
162. Stopping the Money Flow, supra note 154, at 1-2.
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domestic policy, the benefits of a cohesive international policy will not
be fully realized.

IV. SOLUTION

In order to eliminate or at least address the problems and
inefficiencies posed by the current MILA regime, nations have two
general options: (1) eliminate the current MLA program entirely, and
start from scratch in favor of a different mechanism or set of
mechanisms to exchange information, or (2) reform the current
system in such a fashion that ameliorates the issues it currently
faces.
A. Impracticabilityof Eradicationand Replacement
The elimination of the current MLA program is both unlikely
and an inadequate solution to the problems with the current system.
It would also likely result in additional problems and inefficiencies in
the transition to the replacement for the MILA system. Domestically,
The elimination of the current scheme would require withdrawal
from more than sixty international treaties by the president, and
typically only a six-month window in which to phase out the current
system and implement another method for information exchange. 163
In addition to being politically unlikely, this option is also logistically
impractical, because it would require either piecemeal or wholesale
withdrawal from these treaties-and, should the United States
withdraw, there is no guarantee that other countries would move to
do the same, thus decreasing the possibility that whatever new
measures were put in place would overcome any of the efficiency
concerns posed by the current system. Political allies may view the
decision as a slight to their own system and may not cooperate with
whatever other mechanism the United States tries to enforce.
Without another concrete mechanism in mind that would allow
for cooperation among foreign law enforcement agencies, the
elimination of the current system through withdrawal and only a
brief grace period would either leave thousands of requests in the

163. See, e.g., US-UK M!LAT, supra note 30, art. 22 ("Either party may terminate
this Treaty by means of a written notice to the other Party. Termination shall take
effect six months following the date of notification."); Curtis Bradley et al., Authority to
Suspend, Terminate, or Withdraw from Treaties, THE ALI ADVISER (Apr. 5, 2017),
http://www.thealiadviser.org/us-foreign-relations-law/authority-suspend-terminatewithdraw-treaties/ [https://perma.cc/WUQ8-SFXW] (archived Nov. 10, 2018) (noting
that the majority of actions to withdraw from or terminate treaties have been
conducted by the President, and undisputed by Congress). Additionally, withdrawal
could be an even more complicated solution in other nations depending on their
domestic requirements for treaty engagement and termination.
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lurch, never to be fulfilled, or would require their execution in an
unreasonably short period of time. The DOJ clearly lacks the
resources to surmount the request backlog as it is, so the latter option
seems rather untenable.164 Alternatively, thousands of judicially
enforceable court orders related to MIA requests would suddenly
have no purpose and no clear resolution, absent action taken by the
individual courts to send the information abroad.
In terms of selecting an alternative method through which to
achieve international cooperation in criminal investigations, none of
the alternatives seem to solve the problems posed by the MLATs and,
additionally, raise problems of their own. It is likely that the
American judicial system would at least temporarily return to the use
of letters rogatory, which, as stated previously, are historically more
16 5
The
inefficient and time consuming than the current system.
of
in
place
potential use of executive agreements for cooperation
to
modernize
in
order
branch
reforms approved by the legislative
MLA would require a large amount of political capital-particularly if
such an action is done contrary to the will of Congress-although it
should be noted that the current administration seems willing to take
this route regardless.1 6 6 Ad hoc agreements crafted for particularly
large investigations or areas in which investigations are common
would be redundant, time consuming, and a drain on resources.
Further, they would likely be internally inconsistent and any sort of
judicial remedy for a violation would be distinguishable from other
cases under other agreements, leaving those whose privacy has been
67
infringed upon without realistic redress.1
the
taken through
action
on extraterritorial
Reliance
manufacture of jurisdiction over financial institutions or through
correspondent banking relationships damages international financial
cooperation and disincentivizes financial institutions from doing
business within the United States lest they be subject to its
and regulatory
jurisdiction.1 68 Further, these extraterritorial
methods like anti-money laundering laws have been shown to have
limited efficacy and are plagued by human bias in selecting the
individuals and transactions deemed "suspicious," often resulting in
69
action that reinforces racial and ethnic stereotypes.1

164. See DOJ BUDGET, supra note 9, at 25-26 (describing the significant backlog
faced by OIA in handling MLAT requests).
165. Ellis & Pisani, supra note 13, at 194-95.
166. See WOODS, supra note 28, at 14 (discussing the opportunities for states to
forge executive agreements).
167. Donohue, supra note 106, at 643.
168. Loughlin, supra note 116, at 11.
169. See Baradaran et al., supra note 92, at 527 (showing many firms are still
willing to aid in formation of shell companies); Donohue, supra note 106, at 695 (saying
industry engagement in ethnic and religious profiling regarding terror finance has
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B. Requirements for Successful Reform
In order to effectively combat the problems associated with the
current MLA regime and still manage to have a net-positive effect on
international crime and terror finance, there need to be significant
reforms to the system as it currently stands, and those reforms need
to be both broad and internationally consistent. The most significant
obstacle in the way of treaty reforms on the US side is the
constitutional requirement that such reforms would require that the
legislature ratify any such changes, along with the need for approval
by the executive branch. 170 However, this avenue is both more
politically feasible and potentially more effective than any of the
existing alternatives.
In order to be successful, reform efforts must address the
following concerns: efficiency, uniformity, transparency, and the
1 71
mediation of conflict between nations over criminal investigations.
While these reforms should occur broadly at an international level,
nations could also benefit from domestic legislative and judicial
reform so as to streamline the MLA process.
The current system could greatly be improved in terms of
efficiency through the implementation of an electronic system
through which law enforcement agencies may both send and receive
MLAT data and track pending requests. 17 2 Although, historically,
requests implicating electronic surveillance and covert operations
have been rare, they have the potential to become increasingly
valuable tools to track electronic and financial crime.17 3 These
requests in particular, while encouraged, are not regulated by
international enforcement systems or treaties and would greatly
benefit from the establishment of an electronic system both to
and government
transmission
encourage
efficiency of data
accountability.1 7 4
The establishment of a uniform electronic system across all
nations engaged in MLA would also address some of the resource
75
Nations with fewer
disparities present in the current system.s
resources, or those who receive more requests, would have to put less
effort into tracking requests and transmitting information, while
focused on individuals connected with the Middle East, either through passports,
personal identification, religion, or Arab-sounding names).
170. WOODS, supra note 28, at 14.
171. See id. at 5-6.
172. Id. at 2.
173. See Halvarsson, supra note 36, at 32 ("[S]pecial investigative techniques
[such as electronic surveillance and covert operations] are acknowledged as important
tools in the suppression of transnational crime.").
174. Id. at 30-31.
175. See WOODS, supra note 28, at 8 (suggesting such a system would "alleviate
some of the strain on the current regime and reduce the time and effort necessary to
ensure that the request [complies with requirements].").
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streamlining compliance for all nations involved. It could also
to
ongoing
related
information
centralize
potentially help
investigations in more than two countries and minimize the effort
necessary to comply with multiple overlapping requests. Limiting the
number of steps necessary to comply with an MIA request would
further efficiency goals and reduce the burden on central
authorities. 17 6 An electronic system would also allow for a uniform
system of ensuring that MLA data is transmitted securely and
7
safely.' 7
The establishment of an electronic system also has implications
for increasing uniformity among treaty requests and responses. In
order to streamline the current system, uniformity is necessary both
in execution and in form. There would be a global benefit from the
creation of uniform requirements for MLA, or at the very least a form
for each treaty that has been predetermined as compliant with treaty
requirements.' 7 8 This way, central authorities will spend less time
reviewing requests for compliance and will have more resources to
devote to ensuring execution. Uniformity in execution, particularly
among the various local law enforcement agencies in the United
States, will also result in ensuring that the domestic actions taken
are both legal in the receiving nation and proportional to the scope of
the request.' 7 9 Such a tracking mechanism would also enable nations
or international organizations to compile data on requests globally
and be better able to address structural and operational concerns as
they arise in the future.
The goal of uniformity would also be furthered by the
establishment of an "international clearinghouse," so to speak, to
mediate conflict between governments over requests and to centralize
reform efforts.1 8 0 MLA would be significantly furthered by the
creation of an international organization that maintained contact
with (or perhaps was housed within) other domestic and international
regulatory bodies like the FATF and OFAC in order to ensure that
MLA reform efforts are both proportional and transparent,
particularly when they implicate global financial institutions.1 8 1 A
third-party entity could also mediate conflicts between nations over
compliance and provide mechanisms through which to ensure that
data sent between nations is handled appropriately and that data
privacy concerns are addressed. Global financial institutions in
particular have a significant stake in the reform of the MLA process
because they must comply with domestic and international

176.
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requirements surrounding the disclosure of customer data, which
may include the provision of notice to the customer, and which may
implicate the privacy of their other customers not subject to MLA
requests. 1 82 Finally, a third-party intermediary would be in the best
position to establish methods of redress for abuse of the MLA system,
both by nations burdened by requests, and by individuals seeking to
challenge the requests as overbroad or unduly infringing upon their
privacy interests without legitimate law enforcement interests at
stake.1 8 3
The reforms to MLA could also easily be crafted to address the
numerous human rights concerns cited by nations hesitant to comply
with treaty requirements. Treaty provisions could be reformed to
require requests for data to be narrowly tailored to protect customer
and subject privacy, as well as to prevent unauthorized use and
disclosure of data. 1 84 Requests should also be required to be justified
by relevance to a legitimate government interest or ongoing
investigation, and to be proportional to the scope of the investigation,
and compliance should not be required if such information could be
used to perpetuate human rights abuses. 1 85 These provisions would
help increase transparency and accountability if a third-party
organization has an effective oversight mechanism.
C. InternationalImplications of Reform
While the above reforms would certainly improve the system as
it stands, the assumptions on which the concept of MLA rests are not
necessarily always secure. MLA conceptually assumes that nations
will be able to overcome international constraints on conducting
extraterritorial law enforcement investigations through reciprocity
and mutual interests.1 8 6 However, if nations' interests and values or
their relative resource expenditures do not sufficiently align, then
MIA risks creating more problems than it solves, including the loss of
domestic political consensus and the undesirable use of the
information exchanged between the parties.1 8 7

182. See id. at 12 ("[C]ompanies must have transparent and consistent policies to
guide their disclosure of customer data in accordance with local law enforcement
requests." Additionally, where disclosing data, companies should seek to protect their
customers' basic right to privacy.).
183. Id. at 16.
184. See id. at 6 ("Even where the governmental interest in the data is
overwhelming, though, this access should not be automatic - the requesting state must
prove that it has a legitimate interest in the data, and its request must be narrowly
tailored and proportionate to the crime being investigated.").
185. Id. at 6-7.
186. Luz Estella Nagle, U.S. Mutual Assistance to Colombia: Vague Promises and
DiminishingReturns, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1235, 1239 (2000).
187. Id. at 1247.
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For example, agreements with nations controlled by corrupt
regimes pose further problems because, although the dual criminality
requirement may be met, the United States has no assurance that the
information it provides will not be used to perpetrate human rights
abuses, including interrogation through torture, wrongful convictions,
and excessive punishment.1 8 8 This issue has been particularly
starkly displayed in the relationship between the United States and
Colombia. Such agreements thus lose political popularity, but the
United States continues to comply in order to glean information on
and
narcotrafficking
particular,
crime-in
domestic
18 9
using
States
is
likely
the
United
Conversely,
narcoterrorism.
information obtained from Colombia to track and punish individuals
engaged in the drug trade who, given the level of corruption of the
Colombian government, may have ties to high-ranking government or
law enforcement officials. 1 90 This set of circumstances would
naturally lead to Colombian law enforcement displaying more
reticence to hand over valuable information to foreign governments.
On the other hand, disparities in moral values and theories of
criminal justice could also cut against the United States' interest in
effective prosecution. Recently, the UK's High Court held that the
extradition of an accused hacker to the United States and subsequent
incarceration in the American carceral system would violate the
defendant's human rights.191 Invoking the "forum bar," an
extradition reform put into place after several defendants were sent
to the United States to be tried for conduct that occurred entirely in
the UK, the High Court decided that the defendant's human rights
would not be respected in an American jail, given the lack of mental
192
In
health treatment and the excessive use of solitary confinement.
detailing this decision, a senior legal and policy staffer for Fair Trials
suggested that the deficiencies in the American criminal justice
system undermine international cooperation between the United
States and even its closest allies, which can easily be extended to
3
refusals to comply with American law enforcement through MLA.19
Furthermore, because the extensive burden of the costs of
investigation into money laundering and terror finance is primarily
placed on global financial institutions, the recent increase in the
number of requests and more stringent FATF regulations tend to
disincentivize engagement with the global financial system as a

188. Id. at 1246-47.
189. See id. at 1247-52.
190. See id. at 1291-92.
191. Shaeffer, supra note 71.
192. Id.
193. Id.; Who are Fair Trials?, FAIR TRIALS, https://www.fairtrials.org/aboutus/our-people/our-staff/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2018) [https://perma.cclV9JX-ZDR3]
(archived Nov. 5, 2018).
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whole. 19 4 Financial institutions with fewer resources subject to the
and
anti-terror finance
burden of anti-money laundering
requirements are less inclined to engage with financial institutions
abroad, thus limiting their local customers' access to the financial
system on the whole-including access to credit, loans, and checking
or savings accounts. 1 9 5 Disengagement with the financial system
results in transactions-including those related to criminal activitybeing funneled through illegitimate sources, which are naturally
much more difficult to track by law enforcement.1 9 6 A potential
solution to this problem is to have the FATF implement regulations
requiring the implementation of risk-based account monitoring,
rather than the stringent due diligence requirements which fail to
account for cultural differences, in order to reduce compliance costs
with MLA requests.' 9 7 This shift in requirements would encourage
global engagement with the financial system, thus resulting in fewer
transactions taking place within the cash economy and instead
flowing through regulated, monitored financial institutions. 19 8

V. CONCLUSION

MLA operationalized via treaty is one of the most important
innovations for cross-border investigations in the recent history of
international law enforcement. However, due to the massive
technological changes in the way information is stored and processed,
in addition to the rise of the internet and cloud computing, the
process has become less and less valuable as a tool for international
criminal investigations. Due to insufficient resources to comply with
MIAT requests, as well as the substantial increase in the number of
requests for data, many of these requests are going unfulfilled for
months. Given the transient nature of electronically stored
information, criminal investigations suffer as a result of this delay.
As the international community seeks new methods through
which to fight international financial crime and disrupt terror finance
networks, it will have two choices: reform the process, or devise an
entirely new one. The current system, although flawed, is certainly
preferable to extraterritorial avenues, which come with a much more
concerning host of international consequences. Additionally, many of

194. Loughlin, supranote 116, at 11.
195. Id. at 9.
196. See id. at 11 ("[P]ersons excluded from the financial system often resort to
what is available in the informal, unregulated, undocumented, and largely cash
economy.").
197. See id. at 10 (discussing an FATF report encouraging members to
implement risk-based account monitoring requirements in an effort to efficiently use
limited resources.).
198. Id. at 11.
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those consequences could easily be revised through the creation of an
increased
that includes
standardization,
electronic
system
transparency, and the ability to challenge illegitimate requests. This
would further promote engagement in the MLA system, given the
avenue for redress for privacy and human rights violations, while
streamlining the process for the countries already part of the system.
The proposed reforms are the best avenue through which to achieve
more effective law enforcement investigations in areas that involve
significant amounts of data, namely financial crime and terror
finance.
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